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Recent incidents reveal cyberattacks are being employed and honed 
in a systematic, coordinated fashion to achieve the objectives of mali-
cious actors. Deterrence of the wide array of actors in cyberspace is dif-
ficult, since deterrence has to work in the mind of the attacker. Each 
attacker will weigh the effort of the attack against the expected benefit 
under their own criteria or rationality. This article analyzes whether the 
contemporary and complementary deterrence strategies of retaliation, 
denial, and entanglement are sufficient to deter malicious cyber actors or 
if the alternative of active cyberdefense is necessary and viable.
✵  ✵  ✵  ✵  ✵
Hackers, criminals, terrorists, foreign powers, and virtual states, a col-
lection of actors working in concert online to influence world affairs, 
continue to probe and penetrate cyberspace.1 Many of these actors seek 
our state secrets, trade secrets, technology, and ideas or aim to strike 
our critical infrastructure and to harm our economy.2 Recent incidents 
reveal cyberattacks are being employed and honed in a systematic, co-
ordinated fashion in an attempt to achieve competitors’ objectives. In 
his first major television interview, the director of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, James Cook, said China has hacked every big US com-
pany looking for useful information; however, the cases investigated by 
the US Senate related to Chinese hackers breaking into computer net-
works of private transportation companies working for the US military 
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point more to preparing the digital battlefield for a potential conflict.3 
The Islamic State terrorist organization appears eager to enter into digi-
tal jihad, boasting of plans to establish a “cyber caliphate” from which 
to mount catastrophic hacking and virus attacks on the United States 
and the West.4 Although their aspirations or objectives vary, the wide 
array of malicious actors in cyberspace has one thing in common: an 
expanding choice of cyberattack vectors to enact cyber aggression. Each 
attacker will weigh the effort of the attack against the expected benefit 
under their own criteria or rationality.
Given the ubiquitous nature of these threats, can malicious cyber ac-
tors be deterred? The aim of deterrence is to create disincentives for hos-
tile action and normally involves two components: deterrence by pun-
ishment (the threat of retaliation) and deterrence by denial (the ability 
to prevent benefit). Some notable scholars have suggested a complemen-
tary third component: deterrence by entanglement (mutual interests) 
that encourages responsible behavior of actors based on economic and 
political relationships.5 However, are contemporary and complementary 
deterrence strategies of retaliation, denial, and entanglement sufficient to 
dissuade and deter malicious cyber actors, or is an alternative required?
Deterrence of the wide array of actors in cyberspace is difficult, since 
deterrence has to work in the mind of the attacker. The point of deter-
rence is to add another consideration to the attacker’s calculus.6 Deter-
rence instills a belief that a credible threat of unacceptable counteraction 
exists, that a contemplated action cannot succeed, or that the cost of 
action outweighs the perceived benefits. Complicated issues, like attri-
bution, legality, liability, privacy, trust, and verification hamper conven-
tional strategies and beg for an alternative ability to influence malicious 
behavior. The controversial concept of active cyberdefense (proactive 
actions), which relies on forensic intelligence and automated counter-
measures, offers such an alternative and could limit exposure to threats.
Before considering each of the four strategies mentioned above, it 
is instructive to first consider aspects of cyberattack vectors along with 
current threat-actor strategies. The complexity and severity of acts of cy-
ber aggression indicate that implementation of any strategy will require 
cooperation among all stakeholders in industry, government, and de-
fense spheres. A proven method for national cooperation is the compre-
hensive approach used in international stabilization and reconstruction 
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operations as witnessed through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO).
Attack Vectors and Actor Strategies
A cyberattack vector is a specific method or technique to access equip-
ment, computers, or systems to deliver a hostile payload for a malicious 
outcome. These vectors range from social engineering attacks, Internet 
Protocol (IP) address spoofing, web malware attacks, Bluetooth eaves-
dropping, and other malicious code delivery means by physical manifes-
tation (like thumb drives).7 Cyberattack vectors have grown in number, 
complexity, and sophistication. Their expansive propagation enables 
unbridled acts of cyber aggression, like theft or exploitation of data, dis-
ruption or denial of access or service, and destructive action—including 
corruption, manipulation, and damage or the alteration of data. The 
technical properties of cyberattack vectors that prevent attribution allow 
actors to operate with near anonymity and impunity.
Criminal exploitation, military or industrial espionage, nationalist 
hacker protests, and infrastructure infiltration or sabotage are prominent 
in competitor operations and campaigns. A diverse array of cyberattack 
vectors are used to threaten the security of industrial, commercial, gov-
ernmental, and military systems and devices. Not only has the volume of 
malicious code, known as malware, increased to 31 million new strains 
in 2013, but also the means of delivery have expanded to take advantage 
of human and technological weaknesses and modern-day platforms. The 
most sensational and publicized attack vectors are various types of intru-
sions by groups of attackers categorized as an advanced persistent threat 
(APT) and assaults by distributed denial of service (DDoS) methods. 
APT hacking is designed to covertly penetrate networks and systems to 
steal or alter information, manipulate data, or cause damage. A DDoS 
assault disrupts web site availability by overwhelming network equip-
ment with volumetric attacks or consuming resources with application-
centric attacks.8
The buying or renting of malicious code viruses, exploits of code vul-
nerabilities, botnets, and command-and-control servers provide an array 
of tools and services for motivated threat actors and states. The state-
criminal nexus is evident, as cyber intruders who commit crimes and 
espionage use similar methods, for instance Remote Access Trojan tools 
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that capture and extract information, including Poison Ivy, Ghost, and 
PlugX.9 For those actors willing to pay, professional hackers are for hire, 
including the Hidden Lynx group, which operates from China. Hid-
den Lynx professionals obtain specific information that could be used to 
gain competitive advantages at both corporate and nation-state levels.10 
They have been involved in several high-profile campaigns, including 
Operation Aurora—the obscure APT intrusions on Google and more 
than 30 other companies disclosed in 2010.11
A medium-sized Chinese APT group (about 50 members) ran the 
NetTraveler cyberespionage campaign. This malware infected more than 
350 victims in 40 countries from 2005 through 2013.12 The group stole 
more than 22 gigabytes of data found on 30 command-and-control 
servers.13 The domains of interest they sought were space exploration, 
nanotechnology, energy production, nuclear power, lasers, medicine, 
and communications.14 However, not all cyberespionage campaigns for 
hire originate from China. An Indian APT group, possibly a commercial 
security firm that has targeted entities and industries mainly in Pakistan 
since September 2010, runs Operation Hangover. Oddly rudimentary, 
the group uses publicly available tools and basic obfuscation methods 
while exploiting only known and fixed vulnerabilities.15
In late 2012, then Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta warned that 
the attacks on energy companies in the Persian Gulf and on banks in 
the United States mark a significant escalation of the cyber threat and 
renewed concerns over still more destructive scenarios.16 Whether or 
not these incidents are representative of catastrophic results is debatable, 
since Saudi Aramco production systems were not breached and the 
longest interruption of the US banks was merely hours. However, prepa-
rations for conflict indicate we may already be in Phase Zero (“Shape”) 
of cyberwarfare campaigns as postulated in the notional six-phase model 
of joint and multinational operations described in US joint doctrine.17 
The head of US Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) stated in Con-
gressional testimony that China was responsible for the APT intrusion 
into RSA SecurID systems.18 Moreover, in February 2013, the long-
suspected role of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in system-
atic cyber espionage and data theft was confirmed by a US security firm 
that exposed APT1, believed to be a military unit under the PLA Gen-
eral Staff Department.19 The Pentagon made further allegations against 
China in its 2013 annual report, alluding to the use of “computer net-
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work exploitation capability to support intelligence collection against 
the U.S. diplomatic, economic, and defense industrial base sectors.”20 
This sort of state-sponsored espionage threatens military operations and 
readiness.21
The cost to the United States in intellectual property (product plans, 
research results, and customer lists) and confidential business informa-
tion (trade secrets, exploration data, and negotiation strategies) theft 
amounts to billions of dollars annually.22 In May 2014 the Department 
of Justice indicted five members of the Chinese military on charges of 
computer fraud, damaging a computer, aggravated identify theft, and 
economic espionage.23 The conspirators, working for Unit 61398 in 
the vicinity of Shanghai, stole trade secrets useful to Chinese compa-
nies, including state-owned enterprises. For example, they hacked into 
SolarWorld computers to steal files about production capabilities and 
cost structure while the Oregon-based company was an active litigant in 
trade cases against Chinese solar manufacturers that had dumped prod-
ucts into US markets at prices below fair value.
The term cybered conflict could be an appropriate moniker to frame 
the complexity and ambiguity of struggle involving cyberspace, includ-
ing hybrid warfare and insurgent campaigns.24 Cybered conflict charac-
terizes “old and new forms of conflict born of, enabled through, or dra-
matically altered by cyberspace.”25 For instance, cyberattacks occurred 
on both sides over the weekend of Crimea’s vote to secede from Ukraine 
and join Russia in March 2014. Beginning Saturday evening, NATO’s 
main public web site, which carried a statement by the secretary general 
over the illegitimacy of the vote, worked intermittently. A hacker group 
called Cyber Berkut said the attack was carried out by “patriotic” Ukrai-
nians angry over NATO interference; of note, Berkut refers to the feared 
riot squads of ousted pro-Russian Ukrainian president Victor Yanukov-
ich.26 On Sunday, a wave of 42 DDoS attacks hit Ukrainian government 
sites. The Monday after the vote, 132 separate DDoS blasts, most likely 
by OpRussia and Russian Cyber Command hackers who opposed an-
nexation, slammed Russian sites.27 Political conflicts have also spawned 
cyberattacks against Western news organizations, evidenced by the Syr-
ian Electronic Army, a group of pro-regime hackers, compromising ex-
ternal web sites and social media accounts of the New York Times, the 
Associated Press, CNN, the Huffington Post, and Forbes to gain publicity 
for the embattled Syrian regime.28
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Complementary Deterrence Strategies
Deterrence seeks to shape another’s perception of costs and benefits. 
Deterrence requires national resolve to commit resources, enhance co-
operation, or use force when necessary. In July 2013 the US chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen Martin E. Dempsey, US Army, posited 
that national mission teams could counter threat actors’ activities but 
recognized the need to work with other nations to set norms of respon-
sible behavior in cyberspace, while improving information sharing and 
cyber standards.29 In the Senate hearing to consider the nomination for 
the new commander of USCYBERCOM, Senator James Inhofe fittingly 
summarized the central problem in stating that “the lack of a cyber-
deterrence policy . . . [has] left us more vulnerable to continued cyber 
aggression.” When asked “how do we prevent that,” the nominee, Vice 
ADM Michael S. Rogers, responded, “We’re generating capability, we’re 
generating capacity. . . . But in the end I believe we’ve got to get some 
idea of deterrence within the cyber arena.”30 The concept of deterrence 
is still hotly debated in the cyber community, because, for instance, tra-
ditional nuclear deterrence relies on an adversary having knowledge of 
the destruction that will result from transgressions, which is not possible 
in cyber because the secrecy of weapons is necessary to preserve their ef-
fectiveness.31
Deterrence stems from an adversary’s belief that a threat of retalia-
tion exists, that the intended action cannot succeed, or that the costs 
outweigh the benefits of acting. 32 The strategic debate during the Cold 
War over how best to deter nuclear attack normally was divided into de-
terrence by punishment (threat of retaliation) and deterrence by denial 
(limitation of damage).33 Since today US policy would not condone the 
punishment of another country, a more appropriate view of this form of 
deterrence would simply be retaliation. With the strategic and economic 
interdependence that has resulted from contemporary globalization, one 
might also add deterrence by entanglement (mutual interests).34
For deterrence to be effective, it must be based on capability (possess-
ing the means to influence behavior), credibility (instilling believabil-
ity that counteractions may actually be deployed), and communication 
(sending the right message to the desired audience). The achievement of 
these conditions for effectiveness is extremely difficult. State capabilities 
to influence the behavior of threat actors in cyberspace are constrained 
by these actors’ abilities to operate undiscovered for great lengths of 
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time; even if actors are convinced counteractions may be deployed, their 
rationality cannot be assumed. Additionally, the audience of actors con-
ducting cyber aggression is vast and varied in motivations and inten-
tions. No singularly sufficient answer exists to deter different types of 
groups using varied means of cyber aggression.
Identifying the need to “integrate newer behavioral approaches out-
side a rational state based actor construct,” the Assistant Chief of Staff 
for US Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration, Maj Gen William 
A. Chambers, USAF, encourages moving beyond reliance solely on “im-
position of costs to integrate denial of benefits and other methods for en-
couraging restraint.”35 To make this move beyond Cold War-vestiges the 
focus must be on linking cyberdeterrence to desired effects, regardless of 
the actor being deterred.36 The strategy of deterrence by entanglement 
can encourage responsible state behavior—to refrain from the conduct, 
endorsement, or allowance of malicious cyberactivity within a nation’s 
territory—through cooperation based on mutual interests. However, for 
the wider array of threat actors, a different paradigm or concept must 
be considered to achieve deterrence’s central premise—altering an ad-
versary’s behavior. The concept of active cyberdefense that entails tenets 
of deterrence is another method for encouraging adversaries’ restraint. 
Automated, active cyberdefense-technologies can interdict, isolate, or 
remove threat vectors, denying benefit and engaging, deceiving, or stop-
ping adversaries while imposing costs—regardless of the source.
US Department of Defense (DOD) cyberspace policy maintains ef-
fective deterrence is partly founded upon ensuring the capability to re-
spond to hostile acts with a proportional and justified response.37 This 
form of deterrence by retaliation is complicated by the difficulty in mon-
itoring cyberspace, in identifying intrusions, and in locating the source 
with a high degree of confidence and in a timely manner. For example, 
advanced persistent threats conceal detection of attacker identities and 
allow plausible deniability. If definitive attribution can be obtained, the 
military could act within its prescribed authority in self-defense against 
an armed attack-equivalent in cyberspace. The cyberspace policy also 
recognizes effective deterrence in cyberspace is founded upon both the 
security and resilience of networks and systems. This strategy for de-
terrence discourages adversaries through the denial of benefit of their 
attack. In this context, security infers reducing risk by defensive cyber 
measures, and resilience means the ability to withstand and recover from 
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disruptions or attacks. Defensive measures emphasize the continual de-
ployment of solutions to protect multiple threat points, including net-
work, endpoint, web, and e-mail, from cyberattack vectors.
Pursuit of deterrence by entanglement through mutual interests has 
potential to reduce miscalculation and escalation. This strategy assumes 
potential adversaries are stakeholders in cyberspace, so embedded in the 
network they would not attack in peacetime or crisis. The deterrent ef-
fect is restraint based on the cost associated with attacks in cyberspace, 
in particular the loss of access for one’s own purposes. Deterrence by en-
tanglement involves encouraging others to accept a stake in the integrity 
of cyberspace through formal or informal rules or norms. The challenge 
in agreeing upon defined and achievable rules or norms that pertain to 
and are accepted by all state actors in the cyber realm lends credence to 
exploration of other options for achieving the effects of deterrence.
The DOD defines active cyberdefense as the synchronized, real-time 
capability to discover, detect, analyze, and mitigate threats and vulner-
abilities.38 This definition implies the limitation of damage and elu-
cidates the threat of retaliation—both elements of deterrence. Active 
cyberdefense is widely understood to include offensive actions in cyber-
space taken for defensive purposes, with the limited goal of mitigating 
an immediate hostile act.39 Federal or international laws and legislation 
govern any action beyond internal networks. Today “it’s illegal to chase 
bad guys up the wire, even if you have the capability to do so—it’s illegal 
to shoot back.”40
Deterrent Responses to Malicious Behavior
Analyzing the sufficiency of deterrent responses—retaliation, denial, 
entanglement, or active defense—to influence malicious behavior by 
threat actors in cyberspace requires answering the following questions:
•  Can threats of proportionate response realistically achieve deter-
rence by retaliation?
•  Are defensive measures adequate to achieve deterrence by denial?
•  Will cooperative measures restrain behavior through deterrence by 
entanglement?
•  Is the concept of active cyberdefense technically and legally viable?
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Feasible answers to these four questions are found in the following in-
spection of initiatives, issues, and constraints.
Deterrence by retaliation imposes costs for hostile acts in cyberspace. 
Retaliation is based on a nation’s right to use all necessary means to 
defend itself, its allies and partners, and its interests in cyberspace. As 
appropriate and consistent with applicable international law, the means 
for a proportional and justified response includes diplomatic, informa-
tional, military, and economic measures.41 Military response options 
may include using cyber- and/or kinetic capabilities. Under some cir-
cumstances, hostile acts in cyberspace could constitute an armed attack 
within the meaning of Article 51 of the United Nations (UN) Charter. 
Established principles would apply in the context of an armed attack (jus 
ad bellum). First, the right of self-defense applies against an imminent or 
actual armed attack whether the attacker is a state or nonstate actor. Sec-
ond, the use of force in self-defense must be limited to what is necessary 
and proportionate to address an imminent or actual use of force. Third, 
states are required to take measures to ensure their territories are not 
used for purposes of armed activities against other states. Existing rules 
and principles of the international law of armed conflict address the use 
of cybertools in the context of armed conflict (jus in bello).
Regarding the question of whether or not a cyber operation consti-
tutes an armed attack, the Tallinn Manual on the International Law Ap-
plicable to Cyber Warfare (Rule 13) offers, that, it depends on the scale 
and effects.42 Cyber operations that result in death or injury of indi-
viduals or destruction or damage of objects could rise to the level of an 
armed attack.43 Although the Stuxnet computer worm caused physical 
damage, the International Group of Experts that developed the Tallinn 
Manual was divided on whether the damage constituted an armed at-
tack. Future cyberattacks could be structured to transmit data or subtly 
modify, degrade, or corrupt data in a malicious but not immediately 
apparent manner.44 NATO’s Policy on Cyber Defense reiterates that any 
collective defense response is subject to political decisions by the North 
Atlantic Council.45 This ambiguity gives an adversary good reason to use 
cyber as a method of attack against critical infrastructure.46
The imposition of costs in deterrence by retaliation is intended to 
reduce an adversary’s willingness or ability to initiate or continue an 
offensive. While some argue the fundamental interconnectedness of 
networks means the effects of responsive cyber operations cannot be 
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limited, others claim that contained operations are possible even within 
broadly connected systems.47 However, deliberate, inadvertent, or ac-
cidental escalation could trigger a chain reaction that raises the level of 
conflict beyond that contemplated by any party to the conflict.48 In the 
United States, only the president can approve a cyber operation likely 
to result in significant consequences—a tough decision due to the in-
ability to predict collateral damage and the uncertainty over political 
effect.49 Equally, the threat of massive cyber retaliation would probably 
encourage actors to seek low levels of malicious behavior that fall below 
the threshold that would trigger such retaliation.50 In many cases, target 
countries may be constrained to seek justice rather than retribution. In 
court, target states can press for access to individuals or to information 
and use refusal to cooperate as a justification for retaliation. However, 
until retaliation does ensue, there is no punishment—hence, no deter-
rence.51 Meaning the threat alone of proportionate responses will not 
realistically achieve deterrence by retaliation.
Deterrence by denial of benefit denies an adversary’s objectives by in-
creasing the security and resilience of networks and systems. Traditional 
passive reactive methods, like antivirus software and blacklists, have 
grown ineffective as the volume and complexity of threats increase.52 
A defense-in-depth approach emphasizes the continual deployment of 
reactive solutions to protect multiple threat points, including network, 
endpoint, web, and e-mail security.53 The spectrum of cybersecurity 
tools and techniques ranges from next-generation firewalls, applica-
tion whitelisting, intrusion prevention systems and sandboxes to access 
control, data encryption, patch management, and data loss prevention. 
Layering multiple technologies combined with best practice endpoint 
management can decrease the risk of customized malware payloads, be-
cause each layer blocks a different aspect of multipronged cyberattacks. 
For example, at the delivery phase, device control can block infected 
Universal Serial Bus (USB) devices. At the exploitation phase, patch and 
configuration management can eliminate known vulnerabilities. At the 
installation phase, application control can prevent unapproved execut-
ables.54 Cybersecurity frameworks suggest technical measures that can 
monitor networks and systems, detect attack attempts, identify com-
promised machines, and interrupt infiltration. The Council on Cyber 
Security’s Critical Security Controls offers a prioritized program for 
computer security based on the combined knowledge of actual attacks 
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and effective defenses.55 These controls cover a range of best practices, 
including vulnerability assessment, malware defenses, and access con-
trol. The controls identify commercial tools to detect, track, control, 
prevent, and correct weaknesses or misuse at threat points. The top three 
drivers for adopting these controls are increasing visibility of attacks, 
improving response, and reducing risk.56 When the Congress failed to 
enact the necessary legislation, Pres. Barack Obama signed an executive 
order for the development of a Cybersecurity Framework that incor-
porates voluntary consensus standards and industry best practices. The 
inaugural Cybersecurity Framework is built around the core functions 
of identify, protect, detect, respond, and recover.57 The Critical Security 
Controls are part of the Framework’s informative references that illus-
trate methods to accomplish activities under these functions.
To facilitate cybersecurity information sharing, as called for in the 
executive order, the National Cybersecurity and Communications Inte-
gration Center (NCCIC) works with the private sector and government 
and international partners. The NCCIC strives to establish shared situ-
ational awareness of harmful activity, events, or incidents to improve the 
ability of partners to protect themselves. The NCCIC integrates analysis 
and data into a series of actionable and shareable information products. 
In addition, the NCCIC engages with information-sharing and analysis 
centers (ISAC) to protect portions of critical information technology 
with which they interact, operate, manage, or own. For example, during 
the 2012 series of DDoS assaults on US major banks, the NCCIC col-
laborated with the Financial Services ISAC to provide technical data and 
assistance to financial institutions. Data included DDoS-related IP ad-
dresses and supporting contextual information, which was also provided 
to over 120 international partners.58
Agencies and companies acknowledge the need to share more data 
about threats across enterprise boundaries but are worried about liabil-
ity and risk. Commercial offerings, like Internet Identity’s Active Trust 
platform, let contributors retain ownership of data and control dissemi-
nation.59 However, only cybersecurity legislation can enable the private 
sector to share real-time cyber threat activity detected on its networks 
without fear of violating civil liberties and rights to privacy of citizens.60 
Thus, by design, participation in sharing arrangements and adoption 
of industry best practices for securing cyberspace remains voluntary for 
the private sector that largely owns the nation’s critical infrastructure.61 
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Private sector awareness of threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences is 
questionable, when external parties reveal 85 percent of cyberespionage 
breaches months after intrusion.62 Defensive measures are not adequate 
to achieve deterrence by denial, as security has not kept pace with the 
threat; more dynamic, active defenses are necessary. It is not a matter 
of if a company will be breached, but when. While the defense is not 
catatonic, it is not certain the offense will get continually better either, 
particularly when defense defines what the offense can do.63
Deterrence by entanglement encourages responsible behavior, while 
restraining malicious behavior through cooperation based on common 
interests. To some extent, nations share political, economic, commer-
cial, and strategic dependency in cyberspace—as well as some degree 
of vulnerability. According to the UN secretary general, “While all Na-
tions appreciate the enormous benefits of ICTs [information and com-
munication technologies], there is also broad recognition that misuse 
poses risks to international peace and security.”64 The secretary gener-
al’s report, authored by the Group of Governmental Experts, identifies 
that the development and spread of sophisticated tools and techniques 
increases the risk of mistaken attribution and unintended escalation. 
States have repeatedly affirmed the need for cooperative action against 
threats resulting from this malicious use. States must lead these efforts, 
but effective cooperation would benefit from participation by the pri-
vate sector and civil society in a comprehensive approach. An array of 
actions is required to promote a peaceful, secure, and open information 
and communications technology environment.65
One action to strengthen deterrence by entanglement could be the 
implementation of formal binding agreements. Arms control aims to es-
tablish legal regimes that make conflict less likely. The objective of such 
regimes is to reduce the existence of, or restrict the use of, certain weap-
ons. However, imposing limitations on the development and prolifera-
tion of cyberweapons is difficult, because their properties are incompat-
ible with the rationale for arms-control treaties.66 The lack of universal 
consensus on what even constitutes a cyberweapon complicates verifi-
cation of compliance. Most of the technology relied on in an offensive 
capacity is inherently dual-use, like vulnerability assessment tools, and 
software can be minimally repurposed for malicious action.67 Control 
of cyberweapon development, spread, and use is practically impossible. 
Cyberweapons require no controlled materials, identifiable manufactur-
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ing facilities, or restricted skills.68 Open-source software that could be 
used as a cyberweapon is widely available for free or for purchase, i.e., 
the Blackhole exploit kit.69 Alternative devices and systems are continu-
ally being compromised and turned into cyberweapon platforms. Ad-
ditionally, the creator or source of the weapon is not often the user, 
i.e., in hacktivist campaigns cybertools with instructions are provided to 
patriotic or ideological hackers supporting a cause.
Absent practical and acceptable treaties, cooperative measures could 
enhance international peace, stability, and security. Internationally ac-
ceptable norms, rules, and principles of responsible behavior by states 
could encourage order in the domain. These measures start with the 
premise that international law—in particular the Charter of the United 
Nations—is applicable to cyberspace. The Seoul Conference on Cyber-
space resulted in a “Framework for and Commitment to Open and Secure 
Cyberspace” that offers guidelines for governments and organizations 
on coping with cybercrime and cyberwar.70 These guidelines include 
verbatim recommendations by the UN Group of Government Experts 
for states to meet their international obligations regarding wrongful acts 
attributed to them, to refrain from using proxies to commit wrongful 
acts, and to ensure their territories are not used by nonstate actors for 
unlawful acts.
Regional or bilateral dialogue can establish voluntary confidence-
building measures to promote trust and assurance, like those agreed 
upon by the United States and Russia for sharing of threat indicators.71 
Other practical measures to increase predictability and reduce misper-
ception include exchange of views on national policies, like a recent 
briefing by the DOD given to Chinese officials regarding Pentagon doc-
trine for defending against cyberattacks.72 Finally, capacity-building as-
sistance might be necessary for states to fulfill their responsibilities for cy-
berspace. Efforts for assistance range from developing technical skill and 
sharing best practices to strengthening national legal frameworks. Over-
all, cooperative measures—international norms, confidence-building 
measures, and capacity-building assistance—are well-suited mecha-
nisms for deterrence by entanglement. These mechanisms can address 
potential threats, vulnerabilities, and risks, but a clash of self-interests 
might thwart cooperation that restrains malicious behavior. For example, 
Beijing suspended a US-Sino working group on cyber-related issues after 
the indictment of the Unit 61398 members, citing “we should encourage 
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organizations and individuals whose rights have been infringed to stand 
up and sue Washington.”73
Active cyberdefense is defined as the “proactive detection, analysis 
and mitigation of network security breaches in real-time combined 
with the use of aggressive countermeasures deployed outside the victim 
network.”74 These tasks imply defensive measures and proportionate re-
sponses that shape an adversary’s perception of benefits and costs—the 
essence of deterrence. In military terms, the tasks are very similar to de-
fensive cyberspace operations described by the director of operations at 
USCYBERCOM as “passive and active cyberspace defense activities that 
allow us to outmaneuver an adversary.”75 Defensive cyberspace opera-
tions provide the ability to discover, detect, analyze, and mitigate threats 
with malicious capability and intent to affect key cyber terrain. Sub-
categories of these operations are internal defensive measures (IDM), 
actions taken internally, and response actions (RA) taken outside the 
information environment. Tasks for IDM are hunting on friendly ter-
rain for threats and directing appropriate internal responses, whereas RA 
are about going after the shooter outside friendly network space to stop 
the attack.
For the private sector, active cyberdefense entails working with cyber-
security solution providers to identify and interdict cyber intrusions.76 
Once packets are determined to be malware, defensive actions can be 
taken, including diverting packets to a holding area or other actions 
aimed at the attacker. The broad spectrum of actions available include 
using honeypots, beaconing, sinkholing, and deceiving, which raise ad-
versary costs and risks through interference, delay, obstruction, or trick-
ery.77 Even limited action would contribute to assurance (detection of 
intrusions) and attribution (identification of actors). Many public de-
bates center on aggressive response aspects of active cyberdefense, like 
hack back, for which existing legal constraints would have to be adapted 
to allow use of these tactics.78
A more practical description of active cyberdefense is a range of pro-
active actions that engage the adversary before and during a cyber inci-
dent. Examples would be using a honeypot to see which documents the 
adversary chooses to exfiltrate, remotely tracking stolen documents by 
passive watermarks on files, or allowing the adversary to steal documents 
that contain false or misleading information.79 Legal issues confront em-
ploying actions outside of the victim’s network, like taking control of 
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remote computers to stop attacks or launching denial of service attacks 
against attacking machines. The primary law in the United States that 
applies to these more aggressive techniques is the Computer Fraud and 
Abuse Act (CFAA), codified as Title 18, Section 1030. A defendant can 
violate the CFAA by accessing a “protected computer” without authori-
zation or by exceeding authorized access.80
One could argue US common law admits certain rights of self-defense 
and of defense of property in preventing the commission of a crime 
against an individual or a corporation. Applying the latter for hostile 
cyberattacks, the range of allowable actions is roughly comparable to 
the range for nonlethal self-defense. While individuals are not permit-
ted to engage in revenge or retaliation for a crime, they are—in some 
instances—entitled to take otherwise-prohibited actions for the purpose 
of preventing or averting an imminent crime or addressing one that is in 
progress. However, in most cases, challenges in quickly obtaining defini-
tive attribution preclude exercising this right.81 Therefore, under current 
law, a private-sector actor may realistically only respond to hostile attacks 
within its own networks and systems organizational boundaries. Only 
one active defense capability, HawkEye G, exists internal to the network 
today. It uses automated countermeasures to remove cyber threats before 
they can compromise intellectual property or cause process disruption.82 
Until legally viable for vendors to provide solutions outside the network, 
the concept is technically limited to denial of benefit.
A Comprehensive Approach
The US Joint Staff recognizes the government and the private sector 
must plan and coordinate their activities to prepare for cyber threats. 
However, the staff also realizes that achieving unity of effort to meet 
national security goals is always problematic due to challenges in in-
formation sharing, competing priorities, and uncoordinated activities. 
Success in preparation and response to cyberattacks is dependent upon 
unity of effort enabled by collaboration and coordination among part-
ners.83 The US Cyberspace Policy Review also delineates the need for a 
comprehensive framework to facilitate coordinated responses by gov-
ernment, the private sector, and allies to a significant cyber threat or 
incident. The review maintains that “addressing network security issues 
requires a public-private partnership as well as international coopera-
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tion and norms.”84 Deterrence, as an element of cybersecurity policy, 
provides a strategic response that is underpinned by this partnership and 
cooperation. The challenge is to align the efforts of all involved parties 
for a common purpose. NATO has used the concept of a comprehen-
sive approach to align parties in NATO operations by capitalizing on 
shared interests, complementary opportunities, and mutual procedures. 
The comprehensive approach is based on “principles and collaborative 
processes that enhance the likelihood of favorable and enduring out-
comes within a particular situation.”85 NATO proclaims “the need to 
promote a comprehensive approach applies not only to operations, but 
more broadly to many of NATO’s efforts to deal with 21st century secu-
rity challenges, such as . . . protecting against cyber attacks.”86
Although NATO experiences offer a starting point to design a com-
prehensive approach for operations in a particular domain of interest 
(cyberdeterrence), the methodology must be modified and translated for 
different operational conditions, structural characteristics, and promi-
nent partners, including commercial actors. The Comprehensive Na-
tional Cybersecurity Initiative aims to build an approach to cyberde-
fense strategy that deters interference and attack in cyberspace. The 
White House provides a shining example of embracing a comprehensive 
approach for cyberdeterrence by suggesting public- and private-sector 
partnerships for cyberdefense of critical infrastructure sectors.87 Within 
this context of a comprehensive approach, a partnership would be de-
fined as close cooperation between parties having common interests in 
achieving a shared vision.
Given cooperative interaction can potentially facilitate the common 
interests of organizations, the comprehensive approach aims for con-
gruence of purpose—not unity of command.88 However, the approach 
needs to recognize and overcome a clash of self-interests—where one 
party strives to maintain economic or military advantage—that might 
prevent cooperation in deterring cyber aggression. For instance, the pri-
vate sector is reluctant to share cyber threat data with the government, 
because it does not believe the latter can protect the confidentiality of 
a company that has been attacked, which may devalue stocks or com-
promise proprietary information to the advantage of competitors.89 A 
state might not agree to cooperative action if binding rules constrain its 
preferred method of competition in cyberspace. Critical to gaining con-
sensus for the comprehensive approach is the multilateral characteristic 
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of diffuse reciprocity, whereby parties recognize their self-interests will 
be satisfied over the long term. Examination of models and precedents 
in other functions or domains, like the emerging International Code of 
Conduct for Outer Space Activities, could identify principles, measures, 
and mechanisms that not only foster trust and cooperation but also fa-
cilitate openness and transparency.90
In reality, many cyber incidents today are merely easily-corrected 
annoyances—causing irritation, inconvenience, and perhaps delay.91 
Even the vaulted Stuxnet worm that resulted in the replacement of about 
1,000 IR-1 centrifuges at the Iranian nuclear facility in Natanz, only 
exposed vulnerabilities in Iranian enrichment facilities that ultimately 
improved centrifuge performance.92 Whether cyber means are capable 
of inflicting real persistent harm on the fighting power of an enemy is 
doubtful.93 Likewise, the analytical basis for cyber alarmism is dubi-
ous, despite public policy makers ranting repeatedly about wake-up calls 
following cybersecurity incidents.94 However, bolstering that stream of 
concern, the US Director of National Intelligence has testified, “We 
assess that the likelihood of a destructive attack that deletes informa-
tion or renders systems inoperable will increase as malware and attack 
tradecraft proliferate.”95 Admiral Rogers believes China, along with one 
or two other countries, already has cyber capabilities that could shut 
down the electric grid in parts of the United States.96 A comprehensive 
approach has produced interaction among diverse organizations, lead-
ing to a more effective overall effort in operations.97 For cyberspace, the 
framework could enable the implementation of complementary deter-
rence strategies or an alternative that achieves similar desired effects.
Conclusion
The US chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff claims “disruptive and 
destructive cyber attacks are becoming a part of conflict,” and “civilian 
infrastructure and business are targeted first.”98 In response, the Qua-
drennial Defense Review reiterates that deterrence of these sorts of cy-
ber threats requires a multistakeholder coalition that enables “the lawful 
application of the authorities, responsibilities, and capabilities resident 
across the U.S. Government, industry, and international allies and part-
ners.”99 This mandate effectively endorses the use of a comprehensive 
approach to influence malicious behavior in cyberspace. The challenge 
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remains in the number and type of malicious actors with various motiva-
tions and the assortment of cyberattack vectors at their disposal. When 
asked whether the cyber intrusions on JP Morgan Chase, and at least 
four other banks, were coming from entities associated with the Russian 
government, US Secretary of the Treasury Jack Lew replied, “We have a 
lot of concerns about the sources of attacks because there are many dif-
ferent sources.”100
The cyber breach at JP Morgan Chase Bank offers an illustrative case to 
examine the sufficiency of the suggested deterrence strategies or alterna-
tive. In June 2014, hackers used a phishing attack vector to compromise 
a bank employee’s user name and password and enter a web-development 
server. With a variety of malware, the hackers eventually gained access to 
more than 100 servers that housed personal data, but not account infor-
mation, for 76 million household accounts.101 Many believe the attacks 
were a direct result of sanctions imposed by the United States against 
Russia. The lack of any apparent profit motive generates speculation that 
the hackers were sponsored by the Russian government. For this case, 
deterrence by retaliation, by at least military means, falters as the inci-
dent does not cross any threshold for an armed attack. For deterrence 
by denial, JP Morgan’s chairman admits that even though the bank has 
fortified its defenses (with a $250 million annual digital security budget) 
the battle is “continual and likely never-ending.”102 For deterrence by 
entanglement, the question is, would the Russian government investi-
gate if asked, especially if the attack was indeed conducted by a proxy 
group on their behalf. Additionally, for the active cyberdefense concept, 
while the initial authenticated entry would not have been blocked, the 
breach might have been detected earlier by capabilities that discover and 
interpret subtle behaviors in enterprise activity.
In not only the above suspected case of state-sponsored espionage 
but also in other disruptive or destructive forms of cyber aggression, 
each suggested deterrence strategy has limited merit in preventing 
threat-actor action. The promise of active cyberdefense is in autono-
mous countermeasures that act without regard to the identity of the 
malicious threat actors or their motivations—only that their malware 
is isolated or eradicated. Although active defense can close the time be-
tween discovery and compromise, many organizations are reluctant to 
adopt machine-enabled defensives for fear of algorithmic misfires with 
unexpected consequences. Despite preventive efforts, attacks continue 
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and increase in sophistication. Malicious actors are using multiple-stage 
attacks, stretched out over months or using new infection vectors.103
The proliferation of threat vectors and actors will not allow pause for 
policy makers to get some idea of deterrence within the cyber arena. 
Deterrence convinces adversaries not to take malicious actions by means 
of decisive influence over their decision making. Decisive influence is 
achieved by threatening to impose costs or deny benefits while impos-
ing restraint.104 The solution to the dilemma is a mix of strategies and 
capabilities that influence the decision-making process of an actor, re-
gardless if rational or not. Ways do exist to enhance the sufficiency of the 
suggested responses, including imposing real consequences (retaliation), 
employing reactive defenses (denial), sustaining diplomatic perseverance 
(entanglement), and considering legal adaptation (active defense). The 
suggested responses are at least a starting point to achieving an end state 
where the actor chooses not to act for fear of some combination of cost, 
failure, or consequences. 
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